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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
GLENS FALLS FIREFIGHTERS UNION, 
LOCAL 2230, IAFF, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-18006 
CITY OF GLENS FALLS, 
Respondent. 
GRASSO & GRASSO (JANE K. FININ of counsel), for Charging 
Party 
BARTLETT, PONTIFF, STEWART & RHODES, P.C. (J. LAWRENCE 
PALTROWITZ of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the City of 
Glens Falls (City) to a decision by the Assistant Director of 
Public Employment Practices and Representation (Assistant 
Director) on a charge filed by the Glens Falls Firefighters 
Union, Local 2230, IAFF, AFL-CIO (Union). In relevant part, the 
Union alleges that the City violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by submitting to compulsory 
interest arbitration two demands which are allegedly nonmandatory 
subjects of negotiation. City Proposal 8 seeks to eliminate from 
any successor agreement Article XI(C)(3) of the parties' expired 
1993-95 contract, which requires the City to call back to duty 
all available off-duty unit employees before or at the same time 
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as using mutual aid.^7 City Proposal 10 seeks to eliminate from 
any successor agreement Article XVII(A) of the parties' expired 
contract, which establishes a minimum staffing level of eight 
employees for on-duty platoons. 
The Assistant Director held that these two demands are 
nonmandatory subjects of negotiation and he ordered the City to 
withdraw them from interest arbitration. 
The City argues that Proposal 8 is a mandatory subject of 
negotiation because it pertains to the transfer of work exclusive 
to the Union's negotiating unit. As to Proposal 10, and as an 
alternative argument to Proposal 8, the City submits that demands 
pertaining to any and all terms in an expired collective 
bargaining agreement should be held mandatorily negotiable for 
purposes of collective negotiations and impasse resolution 
procedures. If its demands are nonmandatory on all theories, the 
City requests a determination that a public employer is permitted 
to discontinue any and all nonmandatory subjects of negotiation 
after exhaustion of the applicable statutory impasse procedures. 
The Union argues that the City's two proposals are plainly 
nonmandatory, that the incorporation of terms into a collective 
bargaining agreement is irrelevant to a negotiability analysis, 
and that we have no authority in the context of a scope of 
negotiations dispute to issue a declaratory judgment regarding an 
employer's rights to act unilaterally with respect to any 
^Mutual aid involves a request for fire or other emergency 
services from other emergency service providers. See General 
Municipal Law §209 (McKinney's Supp. 1997). 
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subject. It argues that the Assistant Director's decision is 
correct in all respects and should be affirmed. 
Having considered the parties' arguments, we affirm the 
Assistant Director's decision. 
Both of the City's proposals are nonmandatory according to 
the nature of their subject matter. Compulsory call backs of 
personnel generally,-7 and those arising in the context of 
mutual aid specifically,-'' have been held to be nonmandatory 
subjects of negotiation. Minimum staffing demands are also 
nonmandatory. -1 
The City's alternative argument, which would convert a 
nonmandatory subject of negotiation into a mandatory subject 
/ simply by virtue of the parties' incorporation of the subject 
into a collective bargaining agreement, would admittedly 
necessitate reversal of our decision in Johnstown Police 
Benevolent Association (hereafter Johnstown) ,-f In Johnstown, 
the employer made exactly the same request of us as the City 
makes here. In a decision which considered at length the 
advantages and disadvantages of adopting a "metamorphosis theory11 
of negotiability, we determined that it was premature to depart 
from our traditional approach under which negotiability is 
^Hudson Falls Permanent Firefighters, Local 2730, 14 PERB $3021 
(1981). 
g/City of Saratoga Springs, 16 PERB $3 058 (1983); Local 589, 
IAFF, 16 PERB $3030 (1983). 
-
7See, e.g. , Local 294, IBT, 10 PERB $3007 (1977) . 
5/25 PERB $3085 (1992) . 
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determined by the nature of the subject matter in issue.-7 
Nothing has changed in the interim to persuade us to reverse 
Johnstown at this date. 
In Johnstown. we recognized that there could be problems 
caused to bargaining relationships by the requirement under 
§209-a.l(e) that employers continue all terms in an expired 
agreement, whether mandatorily negotiable or not, if the scope of 
mandatory negotiation were not expanded to include the terms of 
an expired contract which the employer must maintain until a new 
agreement is negotiated. We also recognized, however, that the 
potential problem was largely, if not entirely, academic if 
parties were willing voluntarily to negotiate nonmandatory 
subjects of negotiation, at least those contained in an expired 
contract, despite the absence of statutory obligation to do so. 
Preferring to leave to the Legislature questions as to whether 
the traditional scope of mandatory bargaining should be expanded, 
we ended our decision in Johnstown with the suggestion that we 
might in the future expand the scope of bargaining if 
circumstances warranted a change. 
Although the Legislature has not addressed the potential 
bargaining problems we identified in Johnstown, we have not seen 
a transformation of the theoretical to the real. Until this 
case, we have not had presented to us since Johnstown any scope 
of negotiation dispute involving a union's refusal to negotiate 
^See, e.g.f State of New York (Dep't of Transp.), 27 PERB f3056 
(1994); Peekskill City Sch. Dist.. 16 PERB f3075 (1983). 
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an employer's demand to discontinue or modify a nonmandatory term 
contained in an expired agreement. Neither have we had any case 
where an employer has unilaterally discontinued a nonmandatory 
term of an expired agreement after an interest arbitration award 
has issued and defended that change on the ground that the union 
had previously refused demands to bargain regarding the expired 
contract term. 
Just as in Johnstown, the City's argument here rests to a 
large degree on an assumption that §209-a.l(e) of the Act 
guarantees a nonstriking union the continuation of all expired 
contract terms in perpetuity regardless of circumstances. As we 
stressed in Johnstown, that is an assumption only and one 
untested in any subsequent proceeding.^7 Not having had any 
case to decide since Johnstown to test the validity of the City's 
assumption,-7 the negotiability analysis and approach remains as 
it was when we decided Johnstown. 
Whether the City would be privileged to discontinue or 
modify the terms of the parties' agreement if those terms were 
not addressed by an interest arbitration award because the Union 
Z/The Appellate Division's recent decision in City of Utica v. 
Zumpano. A.D.2d , 30 PERB f7502 (4th Dep't 1997), merely 
allowed a union's grievance regarding a. claimed breach of a 
minimum staffing clause to proceed to arbitration. The Court did 
not consider the parties' bargaining rights nor the effect of 
positions taken during bargaining on the disposition of an 
improper practice charge filed under §209-a.i(e) of the Act. 
-'That circumstance would arise if an employer changed a 
nonmandatory term in an expired agreement and defended that 
change on the ground that the union had refused demands to 
negotiate about the term which was changed and/or the union had 
prevented the arbitration panel from considering the merits of 
the term of the expired contract in issue through an objection to 
arbitrability. 
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prevented those demands from being reviewed on their merits by 
the arbitration panel is an issue not now before us. We have 
consistently refused to speculate in the context of a scope of 
negotiation charge about an employer's obligations or a union's 
rights under §209-a.l(e) of the Act if a union has refused to 
bargain about any terms, even if nonmandatory, contained in a 
collective bargaining agreement.27 Moreover, as the Assistant 
Director stated, nothing in the Act, our Rules of Procedure 
(Rules) or case law permits us to grant affirmative relief to a 
respondent in an improper practice proceeding.^7 
For the reasons set forth above, the City's exceptions are 
denied and the Assistant Director's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the City withdraw from 
compulsory interest arbitration its proposals numbered 8 and 10. 
DATED: September 9, 1997 
Albany, New York. 
T^arc X- Abbvott, Msfifcer 
-^See, e.g., Village of Mamaroneck Police Benevolent Ass**n, 
22 PERB 53029 (1989). 
—
7Our declaratory ruling procedure in Part 210 of our Rules only 
allows for a declaration of rights regarding the scope of 
negotiations and the applicability of the Act to persons, 
employee organizations and employers. 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 10 00, AFSCME, LOCAL 82 6, LIVINGSTON 
COUNTY UNIT, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-17835 
COUNTY OP LIVINGSTON, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOPPMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (TIMOTHY CONNICK Of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
HARRIS BEACH ft WILCOX (DAVID W. LIPPITT of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions and cross-exceptions 
filed, respectively, by the Civil Service Employees Association, 
Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, Local 836, Livingston County Unit 
(CSEA), and the County of Livingston (County) to a decision by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). As relevant to this appeal, CSEA 
alleges in its charge that the County violated §209-a.l(d) of the 
Public Employees' Pair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally 
discontinued a practice under which unit employees were given paid 
release time from work to attend grievance arbitration hearings on 
CSEA's behalf.!/ 
-
7Neither party excepts to the ALJ's dismissal of the other 
allegations in the charge. 
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After a hearing, the ALJ held that this allegation was within 
PERB's jurisdiction, notwithstanding §205.5(d) of the Act,^ 
because the parties' contract was not a source of right to CSEA in 
relevant respect and, therefore, the charge did not present an 
arguable contract violation. The County excepts to the ALT's 
jurisdictional determination. The ALJ dismissed this aspect of 
the charge on the merits, however, upon the conclusion that 
Article 24, Section 5, of the parties' contract gave the County 
the right not to extend paid release time to employees appearing 
at arbitrations on CSEA's behalf. Therefore, the ALJ held that 
the County was entitled to revert to the narrower terms of its 
collective bargaining agreement notwithstanding the past practice 
to the contrary. CSEA excepts to the ALJ's merits determination. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's jurisdictional determination, but 
reverse the ALJ's dismissal of the charge on the merits. 
As to the jurisdictional issue, the parties' contract does 
not address release time, paid or unpaid, for unit employees other 
than those who are designated union officers or grievance 
representatives. The County instead relies upon the following 
contractual provision, which was the basis for the ALJ's merits 
^That section provides in relevant part that we "shall not 
exercise jurisdiction over an alleged violation of . . . an 
agreement that would not otherwise constitute an improper 
employer . . . practice." 
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dismissal, in support of its contention that we lack jurisdiction 
over the unilateral change aspect of the charge: 
Article 24, Section 5. 
The fees and expenses of the arbitration and the costs 
of hearing room shall be shared by the employer and the 
Association. All other expenses shall be borne by the 
party incurring them. Neither party shall be 
responsible for the other party's share of the divided 
costs nor the expense of witnesses or participants 
called by the other. 
We have jurisdiction over alleged unilateral changes in terms 
and conditions of employment unless an existing contract gives a 
charging party a reasonably arguable source of right regarding the 
subject of its improper practice charge.57 The test of our 
jurisdiction under §205.5(d) of the Act is not, as the County 
argues, whether some provision of the parties' current contract 
may be relevant to the disposition of the charge and may require 
interpretation. The jurisdictional limitation in §205.5(d) of the 
Act is implicated only when a term of the contract has arguably 
been violated by the respondent's action at issue under the 
charge.^ 
Nothing in Article 24, Section 5, affords CSEA unit employees 
a contractual right to paid release time to attend or testify at 
an arbitration hearing. CSEA claims no such contractual right, and 
^County of Nassau. 23 PERB f3051 (1990). 
^Even then, not all contract violations fall outside our 
jurisdiction. See, e.g., City of Newburqh. 30 PERB 53027 (1997) 
(contract clause only incorporating terms of the Act does not 
divest agency of jurisdiction). 
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the County argues that Article 24, Section 5, is a source of 
right, not to CSEA, but to it, permitting it to deny the release 
time to unit employees which CSEA argues is owed them under 
established practice. The ALJ was, therefore, correct in holding 
that the unilateral change allegation is within our jurisdiction 
to decide on the merits. 
Two issues are presented in our consideration of the merits. 
The first is whether CSEA has proven a unilateral change in 
practice embracing a mandatorily negotiable subject. Paid release 
time from work is clearly mandatorily negotiable. The record also 
establishes that the County's practice was to afford paid release 
time for employees attending arbitration hearings on CSEA's 
behalf. As the County changed that practice without any 
negotiations with CSEA, it violated its duty to negotiate unless, 
as the ALJ held, Article 24, Section 5, is applicable and exempts 
the County from any statutory obligation to provide the paid 
release time to its employees. If so, then notwithstanding the 
broader noncontractual practice, the County would have the right 
under the Act to revert to the terms of the parties' collective 
bargaining agreement.-'' 
An employer's "reversion" rights are to the terms of the 
parties' agreement. Therefore, consideration of a reversion 
defense simply necessitates a determination as to the meaning of 
^State of New York - Unified Court Svs., 26 PERB [^3013 (1993) ; 
Maine-Endwell Cent. Sch. Dist. , 15 PERB ?[3025 (1982). 
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the parties' agreement under ordinary principles of contract 
interpretation.^ In this case, there being no relevant 
negotiating history,-7 the necessary contract interpretation 
rests upon the language of Article 24, Section 5, in light of the 
contract as a whole and the parties' practice thereunder over 
time. 
Article 24, Section 5, has been in the parties' agreements 
unchanged since the early 1970s. The fact that the County has for 
years afforded unit employees paid release time to attend 
arbitration hearings at CSEA's demand and on its behalf 
notwithstanding Article 24, Section 5, is some evidence that it 
never considered that indefinite clause to be applicable to 
release time for its employees. 
Moreover, and more persuasive, are other parts of the 
parties' contract, cited by the AU, which refer specifically to 
time off from work without loss of pay for CSEA officers and 
representatives. Those other sections of the contract evidence an 
intent by the parties to address release time with some 
specificity when they intend to address that subject at all. By 
not referring to release time in Article 24, Section 5, instead 
^By using a waiver analysis, the ALJ held the County to a 
standard of proof not applicable in these circumstances. The 
issue is not whether CSEA waived bargaining rights, but what the 
parties intended by Article 24, Section 5. 
^The unit president's beliefs and understandings regarding the 
clause are not probative of its meaning as they reflect nothing 
more than an opinion, not grounded upon any mutual discussions or 
exchanges of promises between CSEA and the County. 
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addressing only the costs, fees and expenses incurred in 
conjunction with an arbitration proceeding, we believe that the 
parties manifested a mutual intent to leave the issue of release 
time from work for unit employees unregulated and unaddressed by 
Article 24, Section 5. 
In addition, the language of the clause itself is not 
reasonably susceptible to the interpretation given it by the ALJ. 
Article 24, Section 5, deals with "fees", "costs" and "expenses" 
"incurred" by a party. Release time from work is certainly not a 
cost or expense incurred by CSEA and is at best a cost imposed 
upon the County. Even if the County could be said to have 
incurred a cost indirectly through the imposition of a paid 
release time obligation, Article 24, Section 5 would require the 
County to absorb that indirectly incurred cost. The types of 
costs and expenses identified in Article 24, Section 5, involve 
payments of money for services rendered in conjunction with an 
arbitration. Release time from work simply does not involve the 
settlement of an incurred debt by payment thereof. 
Having concluded that Article 24, Section 5, is not 
applicable to release time from work for unit employees attending 
or participating at arbitration hearings at CSEA's demand and on 
its behalf, the County violated §209-a.l(d) by unilaterally 
rescinding the noncontractual practice in that regard. 
For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ's jurisdictional 
determination is affirmed and the County's exceptions in that 
Board - U-17835
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regard are denied. The ALJ's merits determination is reversed and 
CSEA's exceptions in that regard are granted. Having found the 
County to have violated §209-a.l(d) of the Act, the County is 
hereby ordered to: 
1. Restore the practice pertaining to release time from 
work for unit employees attending or participating at 
arbitration hearings at CSEA's demand and on its behalf. 
2. Make unit employees whole for any wages or benefits lost 
as a result of the County's elimination of the practice 
in paragraph 1 above,& with interest on any sum owed 
at the currently prevailing maximum legal rate. 
3. Sign and post notice in the form attached in all 
locations at which notices of information to unit 
employees are posted. 
DATED: September 9, 1997 
Albany, New York 
,4-^  t^ ^ Pauline/R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
/ /A _ 
Marp A. Abbott, Member 
^This aspect of the order requires the County to credit 
employees' records for any time they charged or, for any unit 
employees who may have taken leave without pay to attend or 
participate at an arbitration hearing, to pay them at the 
employee's then prevailing wage or salary rate for the time taken 




THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the County of Livingston (County) in the unit represented by the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, Local 826, Livingston County Unit, that the County will: 
1. Restore the practice pertaining to release time from work for unit employees attending or participating at 
arbitration hearings at CSEA's demand and on its behalf. 
2. Make unit employees whole for any wages or benefits lost as a result of the County's elimination of the 
practice in paragraph 1 above, with interest on any sum owed at the currently prevailing maximum legal rate. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
COUNTY OF LIVINGSTON 
Th" ~ Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
b}. ^ny other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FEDERATION, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-17423 
STATE OF NEW YORK (DEPARTMENT OF LABOR), 
Respondent. 
WILLIAM P. SEAMON, ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL (LISA KING Of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (MAUREEN SEIDEL of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Public 
Employees Federation, AFL-CIO (PEF) to a decision by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALT). After a hearing, the ALJ 
dismissed PEF's charge which alleges that the State of New York 
(Department of Labor) (State) violated §209-a.l(a) and (c) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by not appointing 
Ronald Goldstein to a permanent associate economist position^7 
because of his activities as a PEF officer and representative of 
unit employees. The ALJ dismissed the charge upon his conclusion 
that deficiencies in Goldstein's job performance in the 
-'Goldstein thereupon reverted to his position as a senior 
economist. 
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provisional position, not his protected union activities, were 
the reason Goldstein was not made permanent in the associate 
economist position. 
PEF#s exceptions are grounded upon an allegedly erroneous 
evidentiary ruling made by the ALJ. PEF argues that the ALJ 
should not have allowed the State to offer any proof of 
performance deficiencies because the reason Goldstein was given 
for not being made permanent was that the Department of Civil 
Service required his removal from the provisional position 
because a new eligibility list had been established. 
The State, relying upon its brief to the ALJ, argues that 
the ALJ's decision is correct and should be affirmed. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision. 
The ALJ's decision rests on credibility resolutions. As the 
record reveals no basis upon which to disturb those 
determinations, PEF must and does argue that the ALJ erred as a 
matter of law in accepting and considering any evidence 
concerning reasons for not making Goldstein permanent other than 
the one given to Goldstein despite the relevance of that evidence 
to the issue in dispute. Arguing that the stated reason was 
incorrect and untrue, PEF contends that we must conclude as a 
matter of law that Goldstein's protected union activities were 
the real reason for his failure to obtain a permanent 
appointment. 
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A demonstrated discrepancy in the reasons for an action is 
clearly relevant to an assessment of a respondent's motive for an 
action,-' but not dispositive of that motive as a matter of law. 
A respondent's articulation of one reason for an action, even if 
that reason is later proven to be completely pretextual, does not 
mean that there were not and cannot be other, lawful reasons for 
its actions. A respondent's failure to give any reason to an 
employee for its adverse treatment of that employee, or the fact 
it has given one reason but not another, does not prohibit the 
respondent from submitting evidence of a reason or additional 
reasons for the first time at a later date, including at a 
hearing before an ALJ.-/ 
To the extent there is a discrepancy between the stated 
reasons for an action given to an employee at one date and a 
later date, the discrepancy bears only upon the credibility of 
the latter proffered rationale and, ultimately, the respondent's 
motive.-x As appropriate, an A U may conclude upon the entire 
record that the latter proffered reason is not credible when 
viewed in the light of the earlier stated reason, and may 
conclude from that inconsistency, and all other relevant 
^See City of Utica. 24 PERB 53044 (1991). 
5/See State of New York (Dep't of Correctional Services). 25 PERB 
53050 (1992) (document not in employee's personal history file 
properly admitted in evidence and considered in assessing 
respondent's motive for discharge of employee). 
^City of New Rochelle, 27 PERB 53062 (1994) (inconsistency in 
reasons for action affects credibility). See also County of 
J
 Orleans. 25 PERB 53010 (1992). 
Board - U-17423 -4 
circumstances of record, that the respondent's real motive was 
the unlawful one as alleged by the charging party. But just as 
an A U may draw those conclusions, so, too, is the ALJ privileged 
and required to reach the opposite conclusion and find no 
improper motive if that finding is the one warranted by the 
record and the ALJ's credibility assessments. 
The cases cited by PEF in support of its argument that the 
ALJ was prohibited from receiving and considering relevant 
evidence regarding performance deficiencies are inapposite as 
they involve restrictions on the power of the judiciary to review 
administrative action.^7 The cited cases do not impose any 
limit upon an administrative agency's power to receive and 
consider evidence which is material and relevant to the 
disposition of the matter pending before the agency. Indeed, the 
ALJ had an obligation to create a full and complete record-7 by 
allowing the introduction of noncumulative evidence relevant to 
the issues in dispute. 
Although we disagree with PEF's contention that the ALJ 
erred by admitting material and relevant testimony regarding job 
performance deficiencies, we do agree with its contention that 
the ALJ was required to consider any discrepancy between the 
reason Goldstein was given for his removal from the provisional 
-''Scherbyn v. Wayne-Finger Lakes Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs. . 77 
N.Y.2d 753 (1991); Aronsky v. Bd. of Educ.. Community Sch. Dist. 
No. 22 of the Citv of New York. 75 N.Y.2d 997 (1990); Central NY 
Coachlines, Inc. v. Larocca, 120 A.D.2d 149 (3d Dep't 1986). 
^Rules of Procedure §204.7(d). 
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appointment and the reasons given for that same action at the 
hearing because, as noted, that discrepancy is relevant to 
credibility and motive. The ALJ did not specifically state in 
his decision that he considered the differences in the reasons in 
making his credibility resolutions favorable to the State. This 
silence does not mean, however, that the AKT failed to take those 
differences into account in making his determination. To the 
contrary, the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the 
record is that the ALT determined that any inconsistency in 
stated reasons did not render the State's witnesses' testimony 
regarding Goldstein's perceived performance deficiencies to be 
unworthy of belief. 
The ALJ made two controlling credibility determinations. 
One, that the responsible State agents believed that Goldstein 
lacked certain abilities and traits necessary for an associate 
economist. Two, that those deficiencies were the reason he was 
not made permanent. The ALJ knew of the alleged discrepancy in 
the State's articulated reasons as that discrepancy formed the 
basis for PEF's objection at the hearing to the introduction of 
the performance deficiency evidence. The ALJ also confirmed in 
his written decision the evidentiary ruling he made at the 
hearing. Given this, the ALJ clearly neither overlooked the 
alleged discrepancy in the stated reasons for the State's action 
nor failed to consider it in making his dispositive credibility 
determinations. A remand to the ALJ to make explicit that which 
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is already apparent on the record is not necessary or 
appropriate. 
For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ's decision is 
affirmed and PEF's exceptions are dismissed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: September 9, 1997 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. tinsella,Chairperson 
Mar6 A. Abbott, Member v 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MICHAEL CARPENTER, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-16737 




NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
Employer. 
LLOYD SOMER, ESQ., for Charging Party 
O'DONNELL, SCHWARTZ, GLANSTEIN & ROSEN (MANLIO DIPRETA 
of counsel), for Respondent 
MARTIN B. SCHNABEL, ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL (EVELYN JONAS 
of counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Michael 
Carpenter to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALT) on a 
charge he filed on May 4, 1995, against the Transport Workers 
Union, Local 100, AFL-CIO (TWU). Carpenter alleges that TWU, in 
violation of §209-a.2(c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment 
Act (Act), failed to fairly represent him on disciplinary 
charges-7 pursuant to which he was discharged from his 
-''Carpenter was accused and found guilty of assaulting his 
supervisor, the arbitrator rejecting Carpenter's version of the 
incident as "less than believable" and one which "strained 
credulity". A petition to vacate the award was dismissed by 
Supreme Court, Kings County. 
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employment with the New York City Transit Authority 
(Authority).-7 After a hearing, the ALJ dismissed all aspects 
of the charge, resolving all material credibility issues in favor 
of TWU. 
Carpenter excepts to several but not all of the ALJ's 
findings and conclusions.-7 First, he argues that the record 
proves that TWU did not give him advance notice regarding 
preparations for arbitration. The ALJ found in that regard that 
TWU had mailed a letter to Carpenter dated December 16, 1994, 
informing him of its willingness to meet with him in preparation 
for an arbitration hearing then scheduled for December 28, 1994. 
The ALJ further found that Carpenter received the letter despite 
his denial and despite the misspelling of his "Mathews" street 
address as "Mattews". Carpenter argues that he did not receive 
TWU's December 16 letter and that the ALJ's credibility findings 
to the contrary cannot be sustained because they are illogical. 
As an alternative basis for the dismissal of this 
allegation, the ALJ concluded that even if Carpenter had not 
received TWU's letter, TWU did not breach its duty of fair 
2/The Authority was made a party to the charge pursuant to §2 09-
a.3 of the Act. 
-'No exceptions are taken to the ALT's dismissal of allegations 
that TWU failed to represent Carpenter at the two stages of the 
grievance procedure prior to arbitration, failed to return 
certain of his telephone calls, and failed to give him a copy of 
the applicable collective bargaining agreement. References to 
these allegations in the exceptions are in the nature of 
background information and argument supporting the exceptions 
actually taken to the ALJ's determinations. 
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representation because it did not know that Carpenter had not 
received the letter. Not knowing that Carpenter had not been 
notified of its willingness to meet with him before the 
arbitration, TWU, according to the ALJ, was at most negligent in 
misdirecting the letter. That negligence, however, could not as 
a matter of law breach TWU's duty of fair representation. 
Carpenter does not address the ALJ's secondary basis for 
dismissal of this allegation in his exceptions. 
The ALJ also found that Carpenter did not ask TWU's 
representative, Gary Hansjergen, on January 4, 1995, whether TWU 
would represent him at the arbitration held that date, crediting 
Hansjergen's testimony that he had not spoken with Carpenter on 
January 4 and was that day only briefly in the building where the 
arbitration was held. Carpenter argues in his exceptions that 
his testimony, which should be credited, proves that he did make 
the inquiry of Hansjergen and that Hansjergen said that a TWU 
representative would not be provided for him. 
An allegation that TWU intentionally delayed sending 
Carpenter a copy of the arbitration award was dismissed by the 
ALJ upon a finding, again resting on a credibility resolution, 
that Hansjergen sent Carpenter a copy of the award in March 1995, 
promptly after he received it. Carpenter excepts to this 
finding, arguing that the record establishes that TWU had the 
award, dated February 4, 1995, much earlier than it claims and 
that it withheld the award from him. 
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Carpenter also alleges in his charge that TWU did not 
respond to a letter he sent to the TWU president in April 1995, 
complaining about TWU representatives' past failure to respond to 
certain of his telephone calls and requesting the president's 
"help". Although recognizing a union's duty to respond to unit 
employees' requests for information or assistance regarding their 
employment, the ALJ dismissed this allegation as well. The ALJ 
found that TWU's representatives had previously adequately 
responded to Carpenter's inquiries regarding the disciplinary 
charges. TWU's failure to respond to the general request for 
help was not a breach of its duty of fair representation, 
according to the ALJ, because Carpenter knew by the date he asked 
for help that he had been discharged, knew that the arbitration 
was the last step in the grievance procedure, and had already 
directed his private attorney to appeal that decision without 
having asked TWU to represent him on that appeal. In his 
exceptions in this regard, Carpenter argues simply that the ALJ 
erred in dismissing.what is TWU's unlawful refusal to adequately 
represent.him on the disciplinary charges. 
In response to the exceptions, TWU and the Authority argue 
that the ALJ's findings and conclusions are correct as a matter 
of fact and law, and that the credibility resolutions should not 
be disturbed. Both emphasize that on December 28, 1994, 
Carpenter, upon the advice of his own attorney, waived in writing 
any representation by TWU and released TWU from any 
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representation duties it might otherwise have had after that 
date. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's dismissal of the charge.-7 
As to the allegation that TWU failed to contact Carpenter 
about preparations for arbitration, we affirm the dismissal 
without reaching any credibility issues. Even if, as Carpenter 
claims, he never received TWU's December 16 letter, TWU's regular 
practice is to notify grievants by letter of the days reserved 
for arbitration consultations. A letter was sent to Carpenter in 
accordance with that practice well in advance of the scheduled 
arbitration date. That letter, had it been received by 
Carpenter, would have satisfied any notification duty TWU may 
have had in this regard. 
-'The ALJ also held that all charges with respect to alleged acts 
of impropriety which occurred before January 4, 1995 were 
untimely filed. The allegations which the ALJ clearly held were 
untimely filed are not the subject of Carpenter's exceptions. Of 
the allegations before us on exceptions, only TWU's alleged 
failure to notify Carpenter regarding preparations for 
arbitration is arguably time-barred. It is unclear, however, 
whether the ALJ dismissed the allegation regarding TWU's 
December 16 letter on timeliness grounds. The ALJ did not 
identify any date by which Carpenter should have known that TWU 
would not notify him regarding his arbitration. Moreover, the 
ALJ reached the merits of this allegation without any specific 
reference to a timeliness issue, although the ALJ did make 
specific reference to the untimeliness of the related allegations 
regarding TWU's failure to return phone calls. It being unclear 
as to whether the allegation pertaining to receipt or nonreceipt 
of TWU's December 16 letter ripened before January 4, 1995, we 
confine our review to the merits of this particular allegation 
without deciding whether and.to what extent it might have been 
untimely filed. 
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Even assuming, as Carpenter alleges, that he did not receive 
the December 16 letter, TWU's duty of fair representation does 
not make it a guarantor of delivery or receipt. TWU's duty is to 
refrain from arbitrary, discriminatory or bad faith conduct. As 
the ALJ noted, TWU would have had no way of knowing that 
Carpenter had not received the December 16 letter. There is no 
evidence that it knew that the address on the mailing envelope 
had been misspelled or that the letter, which was not returned as 
undelivered, had not been received. Although TWU perhaps could 
have had some system in place to better ensure that grievants are 
in fact notified of arbitration consultation sessions, its 
failure to create such a system would probably not rise to the 
level of negligence and, even if it did, such negligence cannot 
constitute a breach of its duty of fair representation.^7 
As to the remaining allegations centering on Hansjergen's 
alleged January 4 refusal to provide Carpenter representation at 
arbitration, the allegedly delayed transmission of the 
arbitration award, and the nonresponse to the letter to the TWU 
president, the waiver Carpenter signed on December 28, 1994 
released TWU from all subsequent representation duties in 
conjunction with the disciplinary charges. The waiver of 
representation, signed on December 28, 1994 by Carpenter and his 
attorney, is clear and explicit and it was executed voluntarily 
^Smith v. Sipe, 67 N.Y.2d 928 (1986); Altimari v. Parker, 189 
A.D.2d 982, 26 PERB 57516 (3d Dep't 1993); Civil Serv. Employees 
Ass'n v. PERBr 132 A.D.2d 430, 20 PERB 57024 (3d Dep't 1987), 
aff'd on other grounds, 73 N.Y.2d 796, 21 PERB 5(7017 (1988). 
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and upon advice of counsel. Nothing evidences that Carpenter 
could not have had TWU's representation at that time and 
thereafter had he wanted it. Instead, Carpenter decided that he 
would defend against the disciplinary charges with the assistance 
of a private attorney and he waived any and all claims against 
TWU in conjunction with representation on those disciplinary 
charges. No persuasive reason is advanced and none is apparent 
for us to refuse to give the waiver and the release full effect. 
The ALJ's dismissal of these three allegations is also 
properly affirmed for the reasons stated in the ALJ's decision. 
Dismissal of the allegation regarding Hansjergen's denial of 
representation on January 4, 1995 rests entirely on credibility 
resolutions, which the record affords us no reason to question or 
reverse. The same is true with respect to TWU's allegedly 
delayed release of the arbitration award. As to TWU's 
nonresponse to Carpenter's letter to TWU's president, that letter 
consists mainly of Carpenter's declaration of his innocence and a 
criticism of TWU's representatives. Those parts of Carpenter's 
letter required no response for he did not seek any assistance or 
information. Only the final paragraph of the letter in which 
Carpenter asks for help arguably necessitated TWU's response. 
Although good practice may have warranted a specific response to 
Carpenter's April 1995 letter, we cannot conclude in the 
circumstances of this case that TWU's nonresponse constituted 
arbitrary, discriminatory or bad faith conduct in violation of 
the Act. As the ALJ noted, Carpenter knew when he wrote the 
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letter that the arbitration award was the final contractual step, 
he knew he had released TWU from any representation 
responsibilities in conjunction with the disciplinary charges, 
and he was then continuing an appeal of the arbitration award 
through private counsel. From these facts, Carpenter had to have 
known, even without TWU's written confirmation, that there would 
not be any further help from TWU. 
For the reasons set forth above, the exceptions are denied 
and the ALJ's decision dismissing the charge is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: September 9, 1997 
Albany, New York 
4^1^ fU\<Jil\ 
Pau l ine R. Kinse l la ' , Chai rperson 
Marc*' A. Abbott , Member 
) STATE OF NEW YORK PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
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UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, AFL-CIO, 
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EDWARD F. WESTFIELD, P.C. (EDWARD F. WESTFIELD of counsel), 
for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by New Action/UFT 
(New Action) to a decision by the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director) on a charge it filed 
against the United Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO (UFT). New 
Action alleges that UFT violated §209-a.2(a) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it refused New Action's 
demand for a list of the names and addresses of retired UFT 
members. 
The Director dismissed the charge as deficient on three 
alternative grounds: 1. New Action is not an employee 
organization within the meaning of the Act and, therefore, it is 
without standing to file a charge under §204.1(a)(1) of our Rules 
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of Procedure (Rules).-7 2. The demand was unrelated to the 
terms and conditions of employment of public employees within 
UFT's unit. 3. The information was for purposes of an internal 
UFT election and, therefore, the denial of the demand was a 
matter outside our jurisdiction. 
New Action excepts to each of the Director's bases for 
dismissal. UFT has not responded to the exceptions. 
Having considered the exceptions, we affirm the Director's 
dismissal of the charge without reaching the question as to 
whether New Action is an employee organization within the meaning 
of the Act. 
We have held that a certified or recognized bargaining agent 
has a general duty on demand to provide information to the 
employees it represents about their employment terms and 
conditions.-7 Retirees, however, are not public employees, have 
no terms and conditions of employment, and are not in UFT's 
bargaining unit. Therefore, under our established case law, UFT 
does not owe New Action a duty under the Act to provide it with 
information about retirees. 
New Action urges a contrary conclusion because UFT allegedly 
allows retirees to vote on ratification of collective bargaining 
i7That section of the Rules provides that an improper practice 
charge may be filed "by one or more public employees or any 
employee organization acting in their behalf, or by a public 
employer." 
-
7Westchester County Dep't of Correction Superior Officers' 
Ass'n, Inc.. 26 PERB [^3077 (1993). 
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agreements arid in elections for union officers. Even if true, 
that fact is immaterial for both are matters of internal union 
affairs falling outside the scope of the Act's regulation.57 
Although receipt of the information demanded might, as New Action 
argues, facilitate the retirees' participation in the UFT's 
membership affairs, denial of that information, bearing only upon 
those internal union affairs, cannot violate the Act as a matter 
of law even if the retirees are denied participation in those 
affairs as a result. 
For the reasons set forth above, the Director's decision is 
affirmed and the exceptions are denied. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: September 9, 1997 
Albany, New York 
iiju^.m 
Paulina^R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Marc A. ott, Member 
^Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n (Stanley) . 23 PERB f3052 (1990) 
(membership policies); Buffalo Professional Firefighters Ass'n, 
Inc.
 r 22 PERB f3040 (1989) (membership policies) ; Port Jervis 
Teachers Ass'n. 18 PERB f3044 (1985) (union elections); United 
Univ. Professions/ 16 PERB 13087 (1983) (ratification). 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
(CSEA) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
dismissing its charge that the County of Nassau (County) violated 
§209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act) when it offered unfavorable reinstatement terms to Karen 
Heller, a former unit employee, in retaliation for her exercise 
of rights protected by the Act. 
In an earlier case,-7 we found that the County had violated 
its duty to negotiate when it unilaterally eliminated a three-
fifths work schedule for nurses at the County Medical Center who 
were in the unit represented by CSEA and required those nurses, 
including Heller, who had worked the three-fifths schedule, to 
^County of Nassau, 26 PERB f3083 (1993). 
Board - U-16057 -2 
work thirty-five hours a week.-7 We ordered the County to 
"immediately offer and, upon acceptance, immediately reinstate to 
a three-fifths workweek, any unit nurse who had worked a three-
fifths schedule but who was required to work thirty-five hours 
per week on or after January 1992.Il5/ In October 1995,-' CSEA 
sought enforcement by the Board of this order, arguing that 
Heller was covered by the order and had not been offered 
reinstatement. We then advised the parties that our order 
necessitated that the County offer to reinstate Heller to a 
three-fifths work schedule, at the same salary and benefits level 
she had when she resigned. Nothing in this decision should be 
read to suggest that the County is, or is not, in compliance with 
our order in the prior improper practice charge. Such 
allegations of noncompliance are properly raised in the context 
of an enforcement proceeding. 
Heller resigned from the County's employ effective July 1, 
1992, citing her inability to work the increased work schedule. 
At the time of her resignation, Heller was a registered nurse II 
and was on step 7 of the contractual salary schedule. Pursuant 
to our order, the County initially offered to reinstate her to a 
three-fifths work schedule, working three days a week not two, at 
-
7Since 1990, Heller had worked in the emergency room 21 hours 
per week, on two ten and one-half hour shifts. 
^County of Nassau, supra at 3161. 
-
7CSEA filed the instant charge on October 19, 1994. The hearing 
on this charge was held on January 18 and March 29, 1996. 
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the salary and benefit level of a newly hired nurse, although the 
salary was still under discussion at the time this charge was 
filed. CSEA alleges that the County would not have offered 
Heller such unacceptable terms for reinstatement but for her 
exercise of rights protected by the Act. CSEA points to several 
instances of the County's alleged disparate treatment of Heller 
and unreasonable actions by the County in support of its 
allegation that the County was improperly motivated. 
The ALJ found that Heller had been engaged in protected 
activity in 1992, when she was involved in the filing of the 
original charge, and in 1994, when she sought CSEA's assistance 
in being reinstated. The ALJ, nonetheless, dismissed the charge, 
finding that CSEA had failed to establish any improper motive on 
the part of the County. In reaching that conclusion, the ALJ 
credited the testimony of the County's witnesses, which was in 
large part undisputed. 
CSEA argues in its exceptions that the ALJ erred in 
separately analyzing each of the acts taken by the County which 
are alleged to evidence improper motivation because, taken as a 
whole, they evidence that the County treated Heller in a 
discriminatory and disparate manner for an improper motive. The 
County supports the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of 
the parties7 arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision. 
CSEA alleges that the County was aware that Heller was the 
employee who brought the elimination of the three-fifths schedule 
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to CSEA's attention, posted a copy of the improper practice 
charge in the nurses7 lounge and discussed the charge with other 
nurses. Upon learning of our order, Heller wrote to Catherine 
Hottendorf, the Director of Nursing, requesting reinstatement to 
the emergency room, with her prior two-day schedule. Receiving 
no response, Heller requested that CSEA write to Hottendorf 
seeking her reinstatement. Hottendorf forwarded two letters from 
CSEA to David Pappalardb, the Director of Human Resources at the 
County's Medical Center, for his action. 
After much discussion with CSEA, the County's final offer to 
Heller before the instant charge was filed was a three-fifths 
schedule, to be worked three days a week, but no agreement was 
reached on her salary and benefit level. The County was seeking 
information from the Civil Service Commission and the County 
Attorney about the appropriate salary and benefit level to be 
offered to Heller.-7 
The dispositive issue in this case is the County's motive. 
CSEA failed to persuade the ALJ that Heller would have been 
offered different, more favorable, terms of re-employment had it 
not been for her activities in conjunction with the original 
refusal to bargain charge. 
We see no reason to disturb the ALJ's credibility 
resolutions or her findings of fact. The detailed analysis of 
-''The County had been advised by the Civil Service Commission 
that Heller, who had a break in service of over one year, had to 
begin as a newly hired nurse. 
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each instance of alleged improper motivation supports her 
conclusion that Pappalardo offered Heller reinstatement as soon 
as he became aware that she was covered by our order in the 
previous case, that the County believed the schedule she was 
offered was consistent with our order and the needs of the 
Medical Center, and that Heller's salary grade and step were 
still under discussion at the time this charge was filed. 
Indeed, Pappalardo supported before the Civil Service Commission 
Heller's request that she be restored to the title and grade she 
had when she resigned. 
None of the incidents pointed to by CSEA, either viewed 
separately or as a whole, support a finding of improper 
motivation on the part of the County's agents who were involved 
in either the decision to offer Heller reinstatement or the terms 
of that reinstatement. 
Based on the foregoing, we deny CSEA's exceptions and affirm 
the decision of the ALJ. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: September 9, 1997 
Albany, New York 
LUline^ R. Kinsella, Pau g Chairperson 
Abbott, Member 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Public 
Employees Federation, AFL-CIO (PEF), Claire Pospisil and Sandra 
Williams to a decision of the Assistant Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Assistant Director) 
dismissing their charge that the State of New York (Department 
of State) (State) violated §209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it eliminated the 
positions held by Pospisil and Williams in retaliation for their 
exercise of rights protected under the Act. 
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The Assistant Director determined that while Pospisil and 
Williams had been engaged in protected activities,-7 their 
activities were unknown to Alexander Treadwell, the Secretary of 
State, Michael Stafford, the General Counsel, and William 
Powers, the Deputy Secretary of State, when they made the 
decision to eliminate the positions of Senior Public Information 
Specialist held by Pospisil and Williams. Therefore, the 
Assistant Director found that the layoffs occasioned by the 
position elimination were not in violation of the Act. 
PEF excepts to the Assistant Director's decision, arguing 
that the decision to lay off Pospisil and Williams was motivated 
by union animus, that circumstantial evidence disproves the 
Assistant Director's conclusion that Treadwell, Stafford and 
Powers were unaware of the union activities of Pospisil and 
Williams when the decision was made to abolish their positions, 
and that the reason given by the State for the layoffs was 
implausible and pretextual. The State supports the Assistant 
Director's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration 
of the parties' arguments, we affirm the decision of the 
Assistant Director. 
Pospisil and Williams were both active PEF representatives 
through December 1994. On January 3, 1995, Treadwell, Stafford 
-
7Pospisil was a PEF shop steward from 1982 to 1985 and, 
thereafter, was a member of PEF's Executive Board and PEF's 
spokesperson on the PEF-Department of State Labor-Management 
Committee. Williams was a PEF shop steward. 
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and Powers took office. They had no prior tenure with the 
Department of State (Department) and, therefore, when they began 
work, they had no knowledge of the union activities of Pospisil 
or Williams.-7 
The Department had been directed to reduce its public 
information operation and re-establish and enhance the local 
government assistance offered by the Department. Stafford 
testified that he, Treadwell and Powers met each morning 
throughout January to discuss the Department's operations and 
goals. The Assistant Director credited Stafford's testimony 
that, by the third week of January, the three had determined 
that four positions in the Department's Office of Public Affairs 
and Information Services (OPAIS) would be abolished because 
Treadwell was vesting the agency's publication and public 
information functions in one person, Marjorie Eilersten, the 
Publications Manager, who began work on January 31, 1995. The 
only guestion that remained was when the layoffs would take 
place. 
PEF alleges that Stafford could not have made the decision 
to abolish Pospisil's and Williams' positions in January 1995 
^Stafford, during a chance meeting in early January with 
Pospisil, a former neighbor, learned that she was a PEF 
representative. It was not until late January, when Pospisil 
proposed a meeting between PEF and Treadwell, that Treadwell and 
Powers became aware of her activities with PEF. In February 
1995, Treadwell received a letter from the Civil Service 
Commission, detailing Williams' earlier complaints and praising 
her willingness to speak up. This was the first instance that 
the three learned of Williams' involvement with PEF. 
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because he did not have enough familiarity with the operations 
of OPAIS to know which positions to abolish and which to keep. 
PEF surmises that the decision must have been made later, after 
Stafford became aware of the employees' union activities and/or 
after Samuel Messina, Director of Administration and Management, 
told him about the employees' previous activities on behalf of 
PEF.^7 However, there is no evidence to support the assumption 
proffered by PEF. The decision to eliminate the public 
information positions was not made by Stafford alone, but by 
Treadwell and Powers as well. They did not discuss the specific 
duties performed by the incumbents in the positions to be 
abolished because they were operating pursuant to the Governor's 
directive to reduce public information services and, thereby, 
reduce staff and expenditures at OPAIS. 
In addition, both Stafford and Messina testified that the 
only discussion they had about PEF when Stafford began his 
tenure at the Department was Messina's statement that although 
there were sometimes differences of opinion between labor and 
management, the relationship with PEF had, in the past, been 
"positive and constructive." Further, both testified that 
Messina had not been a party to the new administration's 
discussions on the future of the agency and that he was not 
advised of the potential layoffs until March 1995, when Powers 
^Messina had been at the Department for some time. He was a 
participant in the Department's labor-management committee and 
had had many dealings, some negative, with Pospisil and Williams 
in their union roles. 
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directed him to write a memorandum to James Natoli, Director of 
State Operations, proposing the abolition of the four positions 
in OPAIS and a redistribution of the money saved to the 
Department of State's local government programs. The proposal 
was approved in June 1995, and PEF, Pospisil and Williams were 
so notified. 
PEF points to the fact that neither Stafford, Powers nor 
Treadwell revealed that there would be layoffs until June 1995, 
despite at least two direct requests for that information made 
by PEF in March and May of 1995, in support of its contention 
that the layoff decision was made after the three became aware 
of the employees' union activities. However, Stafford 
testified, and the Assistant Director found, that the proposed 
job eliminations were not disclosed until June because the 
approval for them had not yet been received from Natoli and 
because the layoffs which resulted were not for economic 
reasons, but resulted from the Department's decision to take a 
new direction in service delivery. 
The record fully supports the Assistant Director's 
credibility resolutions. Indeed, in many respects the testimony 
of Stafford and Messina is undisputed. The Assistant Director 
correctly determined that PEF had failed to establish the 
improper motivation necessary in this case for the finding of a 
violation of §209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Act. PEF did not 
establish by a preponderance of the credible evidence that, when 
the decision was made to eliminate their positions, the 
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responsible agents of the State had knowledge of the protected 
activities engaged in by Pospisil and Williams and that they 
acted because of those activities. 
Based on the foregoing, PEF's exceptions are denied and the 
decision of the Assistant Director is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: September 9, 1997 
Albany, New York >, 
Paxiline^-R. K l n s e l l a , (Chairperson 
Mgtrc A. Abbot t , Member 
WL 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Town of 
Brookhaven (Town) to a decision by the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director) on a petition 
filed by Local 342, United Marine Division, ILA, AFL-CIO 
(Local 342). Local 342 petitioned to represent the Town's 
seasonal employees in the following titles: lifeguards, senior 
lifeguards, beach managers, senior beach managers, chief 
lifeguards and assistant chief lifeguards. The Town had several 
objections to the unit alleged by Local 342 to be appropriate and 
it questioned whether any of these seasonal employees are covered 
by the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). The parties 
thereafter stipulated to the appropriateness of two negotiating 
units, one consisting of lifeguards and senior lifeguards, the 
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other consisting of beach managers and senior beach managers.17 
Both units specifically exclude the titles of chief lifeguard and 
assistant chief lifeguard.-7 The parties also stipulated to the 
record upon which a determination would be made by the Director 
as to whether any of the employees included in the stipulated 
units are covered employees within the meaning of State of New 
York,-7 in which a three-pronged test for coverage of seasonal 
employees was established. Under State of New York, seasonal 
employment is casual and not covered by the Act if: 1. the 
season is shorter than six weeks a year, or 2. the employees are 
required to work fewer than twenty hours a week during the 
season, or 3. fewer than 60% of the employees in the title return 
for at least two successive (consecutive) seasons. 
As the first and second prongs of State of New York were 
admittedly satisfied, the parties' arguments to the Director were 
limited to the interpretation and application of the rate of 
return test. The Town argued to the Director that the rate of 
return had to be determined at the level of each of the 
stipulated units, not separately as to each title, and that only 
employees returning to a position within the unit in which they 
-
7The Town had argued in response to the petition that the beach 
managers and senior beach managers were not appropriately 
included in the lifeguards unit because it considered the 
managers to be supervisors. 
^The Town had argued that chief lifeguards and assistant chief 
lifeguards are either managerial or confidential employees 
ineligible for representation in any unit. 
5/5 PERB 5f3022 & 3039 (1972) . 
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had worked the previous year could be considered to have returned 
within the meaning of State of New York. For example, under the 
Town's argument, a senior lifeguard who returned to work for the 
Town the next year as a beach manager would not be counted as a 
returning employee for purposes of calculating the rate of return 
for either unit because those titles are in different units. The 
Town further submits that a 60% rate of return enjoyed by any 
single title does not extend coverage to the employees in that 
title if the combined rate of return for the unit including that 
title is below 60%. 
The Director applied the rate of return at the level of each 
unit,^7 not to each title separately,^7 but in calculating that 
unit return rate, he counted any employee who returned to work 
for the Town in a "related occupational group". In that respect, 
the Director counted lifeguards and senior lifeguards who 
returned to work the following season as either beach managers or 
senior beach managers and employees in the latter two titles who 
returned to work in the following season in either of the two 
lifeguard titles or as a chief or assistant chief lifeguard. 
^The Director, for example, counted the number of lifeguards and 
senior lifeguards employed in 1994 and 1995, and then he 
determined how many of them returned from 1994 to work in 1995 
and how many returned from 1995 to work in 1996. 
^The Director noted that if the rate of return were applied 
separately as to each of the titles included in the stipulated 
units, only the lifeguards would have the necessary 60% return 
rate. 
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The Town excepts to the Director's alleged misrepresentation 
of one of its objections to Local 342's proposed unit,^ his 
alleged mischaracterization of certain of the parties' 
stipulations,-7 and his alleged mistakes in counting the numbers 
of returning employees.-7 All of the Town's several remaining 
exceptions stem from and are in support of its main argument that 
the return rate calculation must be restricted to those employees 
who return to work the next year either to the same title they 
worked in the year before (e.g., lifeguard to lifeguard) or to 
another title in the same unit (e.g., lifeguard returns as senior 
lifeguard). The Director's methodology is argued by the Town to 
be an incorrect interpretation and application of State of 
New York, one not supported by any of the other cases he cited, 
and incorrect, in any event, to the extent he concluded that the 
employees are all in the same "title series". 
Local 342 has not responded to the Town's exceptions. 
Having reviewed the record and considered all relevant 
arguments, we affirm the Director's conclusion that the employees 
in the stipulated units are covered under the Act. As we reach 
this decision by reversing that part of State of New York 
-'The Town denies referring to the seasonal employees as 
"casual". The Director's characterization did not affect his 
decision. 
-'The Town denies linking the appropriateness of the units to a 
determination regarding coverage of the employees as the Director 
allegedly suggests in his decision. The Director's summary of 
the parties' stipulation did not affect his determination. 
-''See infra. 
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imposing a rate of return test for coverage of seasonal 
employees, and as the parties7 stipulations assumed an 
application of a rate of return test, we remand the case to the 
Director for further proceedings, as necessary, consistent with 
our decision. 
The controlling factor establishing coverage under the Act 
is regularity and continuity of the employment relationship.27 
The rate of return prong of the State of New York test, however, 
examines the employment of particular individuals over three 
years, granting or denying coverage to them upon an irrelevancy. 
Neither unions nor employers have any reasonable need to know 
that any particular individual or percentage of particular 
individuals will be employed for a fixed period of years. Their 
bargaining relationships focus upon job titles, not the 
individual incumbents in those titles. Contract negotiation and 
administration are not materially affected by whether an employer 
keeps the same persons in a job from year to year. There is 
continuity of employment so long as an employer has a recurring 
need for employees in seasonal positions. The identity of the 
individuals filling those positions from season to season is 
simply irrelevant to whether the employees in those seasonal 
positions should be covered for purposes of the Act. 
We are also persuaded that the rate of return test is 
inherently confusing and often incapable of the easy application 
g/Villaqe of Drvden, 22 PERB J[3035 (1989) . 
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intended when the test was formulated. The Director's decision 
and the Town's several different exceptions thereto prove that 
proposition. There is much uncertainty as to what the rate of 
return test means and how it should be applied, and in the Town's 
exceptions there is expressed a fundamental disagreement with the 
Director's interpretation and application of that test at very 
basic levels. 
The exceptions devoted to the Director's alleged mistakes in 
counting personnel is persuasive of another reason to abandon the 
rate of return test. That test necessitates an accurate count, 
both by the parties to the proceeding and by the Director to whom 
the information is submitted, of the numbers of personnel in 
various positions from year to year. The Town claims, for 
example, that it was 2, not 3, beach managers who returned to 
work in lifeguard titles, and that 103 lifeguards were employed 
in 1995, not the 101 the Director counted. We believe it 
inappropriate and poor labor relations policy to have a test for 
coverage under the Act which opens itself to arguments that there 
have been material compilation mistakes or mathematical or 
statistical errors. 
We are also very much concerned about the rigidity and 
arguable arbitrariness of a test limited to only one group of 
public employees which extends coverage if the occupational 
grouping, however correctly defined, has a rate of return of 60% 
from year to year,, but absolutely denies all members of that 
group, no matter how much or how often they work as individuals, 
^ Board - C-4573 
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coverage under the Act if the rate of return falls even the 
slightest bit short of the 60% rate in one or more years. We do 
not believe that covered employment exists at a return rate of 
60% but not at 59%, any more so than covered employment exists at 
40 hours of work per week but not at 39. 
The rate of return test is also obviously subject to 
manipulation through an employer's hiring practices. Although we 
have noted that a hiring practice deliberately structured to 
prevent employees from obtaining coverage under the Act would be 
an improper practice,^7 we do not believe that representation 
rights under the Act should be left to the burdens and vagaries 
of proof in the context of a wholly unrelated proceeding. 
In summary, the rate of return test applicable only to 
seasonal employees elicits information about an irrelevancy, can 
be difficult to interpret and apply, lends itself to recurring 
exceptions, is actually or apparently arbitrary, and produces 
litigation inconsistent with the Act's purpose to promote 
harmonious and cooperative relationships among government, its 
employees, and their representatives. All persons employed in 
seasonal occupational titles for which there is recurring need 
should be subject to the benefits and restrictions of the Act if 
the 'seasonal employment is otherwise regular and continuous and 
the employment is not otherwise exempt (e.g., in a managerial or 
confidential position). That regularity and continuity of 
^Merrick Union Free Sch. Dist. , 19 PERB 13058 (1986) . 
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employment is fully established upon the admitted satisfaction of 
the first two prongs of the State of New York test and the Town's 
recurring need for employees in the at-issue titles.^ For the 
reasons set forth herein, we will no longer apply the third prong 
of the test set forth in that decision. Affirmance of the 
Director's decision on this ground is dispositive of all other 
exceptions. The case is remanded to the Director for such 
further processing consistent with our decision herein as may be 
necessary. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: September 9, 1997 
Albany, New York 
%\~ t k^ll 
Paiiline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Marc^A. Abbott, Member 
—
7This decision is neither an endorsement nor a rejection of the 
first two prongs of the State of New York test, only a 
recognition that they have been met in this case and, therefore, 
there is established a regularity and continuity of employment 
sufficient for coverage. We do not suggest by our decision 
abandoning a rate of return test for covered employee status that 
turnover among seasonal employees is irrelevant for all purposes. 
We can envision circumstances, not here present, in which 
repeated, large-scale turnover of seasonal employees over a 
period of years may have relevance, for example, to questions of 
employee organization status or majority support. 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Patchogue-
Medford Union Free School District (District) to a decision by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on a charge filed against the 
District by the Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers (PMCT). 
After a hearing, the ALJ held that the District violated 
§209-a.l(d) of the Act when it unilaterally adopted certain 
administrative regulations pertaining to the investigation and 
resolution of allegations concerning the sexual harassment of 
students (#5148) and employees (#2452). The ALJ held that PMCT 
had timely filed the charge and that the District had received a 
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timely notice of claim in compliance with the requirements of 
Education Law §3813. 
On the merits, the ALJ held two parts of the District's 
regulations mandatorily negotiable. One part of the District's 
regulations requires a unit employee accused of sexual harassment 
to meet with supervisory personnel for the purpose of discussing 
the accusation. If the employee admits the alleged harassing 
behavior, the employee is subject to "further disciplinary 
action.!1 Moreover, that employee in that circumstance must give 
the District an assurance in writing that the harassing behavior 
will cease. If an employee who has admitted the harassing 
behavior refuses to provide a written assurance that the behavior 
will stop, the supervisor is required to recommend "stronger 
corrective measures" against the employee. The ALJ held that 
required employee participation at an investigatory meeting with 
attendant inquiries by supervisory personnel leading to possible 
admissions of wrongdoing and appropriate employment sanctions 
constituted a disciplinary investigation procedure which was 
mandatorily negotiable. 
The other part of the District's regulations held 
mandatorily negotiable by the ALJ requires that a copy of the 
"resolution report" issued pursuant to a substantiated sexual 
harassment complaint be filed with the employment records of the 
alleged harasser. In this respect, the ALJ held that the 
insertion of "negative commentary" into an employee's employment 
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record was mandatorily negotiable as either a disciplinary 
penalty itself or a step in a disciplinary procedure. 
The ALJ also held that application of the bargaining 
requirements of the Act to the two parts of the regulations held 
mandatorily negotiable was not preempted by provisions of federal 
law, specifically Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 
(Title IX)-7 and the federal regulations promulgated 
thereunder. -' 
The District argues in its exceptions that the notice of 
claim requirements in Education Law §3813 were not satisfied in 
this case, that its administrative regulations are not 
mandatorily negotiable, and that the Association's charge is 
preempted by Title IX, a preemption argument supported in an 
amicus curiae brief filed by the New York State School Boards 
Association. PMCT, in response to the exceptions, argues that 
the ALJ's conclusions of law are in all relevant respects correct 
and her decision should be affirmed. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we hold that the allegations in the charge pertaining 
to the District's regulation requiring the inclusion of a 
resolution report in a unit employee's personnel records raise 
jurisdictional issues which are properly deferred; that Education 
'^20 U.S.C. §1681 et seq. 
2/34 C.F.R. §106.1 et se^. (regulations of the Office of Civil 
Rights of the Education Department); 45 C.F.R. §86-1 et seq. 
(regulations of the Department of Health and Human Services). 
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Law §3813 was satisfied Under the Appellate Division's 
interpretation of that statute in Deposit Central School District 
v. PERB (hereafter Deposit);-; and that the District's 
regulations pertaining to an employee's involuntary participation 
at an investigatory meeting are mandatorily negotiable 
notwithstanding Title IX, which neither alters the negotiability 
analysis nor preempts the processing of this charge. 
On the jurisdictional issue, Article XIII, sections (E) and 
(F) of the parties' collective bargaining agreement deal 
specifically with the placement into an employee's personnel file 
of written materials of either a "derogatory" nature or which 
pertain to an employee's "performance". PMCT's allegation that 
existing procedures regarding the creation and maintenance of a 
unit employee's employment records were changed unilaterally by 
the regulation requiring that a copy of the harassment resolution 
report be placed into a unit employee's personnel file plainly 
raises an arguable contract violation, triggering the 
jurisdictional limitations in §205.5(d) of the Act. Pursuant to 
our established jurisdictional deferral policy,-' this aspect of 
the charge must be conditionally dismissed. 
Those parts of the regulations concerning the required 
investigatory meeting with a unit employee accused of sexual 
5/214 A.D.2d 288, 28 PERB [^7013 (3d Dep't 1995), motion for leave 
to appeal denied, 88 N.Y.2d 866, 29 PERB 57007 (1996). 
^County of Onondaga and Sheriff of Onondaga County, 30 PERB 
f3036 (1997); Town of Carmel, 29 PERB ^3073 (1996). 
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harassment do not, however, raise any arguable contract 
violation. Although the parties7 contract contains a grievance 
procedure, it does not have any provisions dealing with the 
investigation and discipline of employees for misconduct even 
generally, and certainly none concerning the investigation of 
sexual harassment allegations. Therefore, we cannot hold that 
the District's unilateral adoption of these parts of its 
regulations arguably breached the parties' collective bargaining 
agreement. Accordingly, this aspect of the charge is not 
affected by the jurisdictional limitations contained in §205.5(d) 
of the Act and it is properly before us for consideration of the 
District's other defenses. 
There are two basic aspects to the District's Education Law 
§3813 notice of claim argument. First, the District argues that 
the claim accrued no later than December 21, 1993. Notice of 
claim under Education Law §3813 must be presented within three 
months of the accrual of the claim. The notice of claim in this 
case was in the form of the District's receipt, on March 28, 
1994, of a copy of the charge from the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director). If 
December 21, 1993 marks the accrual date of the claim, the 
March 28 notice is plainly untimely. The ALT held, however, that 
PMCT did not know, and should not have known, until January 13, 
1994, that the District's sexual harassment regulations had been 
adopted and implemented. Legislative action by the District's 
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board of education in adopting sexual harassment policies would 
not give rise to a refusal to bargain charge^7 and the board of 
education's promulgation of those policies is not the subject of 
this charge. PMCT's refusal to bargain claim could not accrue as 
a matter of law until there was some executive implementation of 
those policies by the adoption of the administrative regulations 
which are the subject of PMCT's charge. The ALJ's decision 
considers in detail the parties' evidence and arguments regarding 
when PMCT's agents first learned of the adoption of the 
regulations in issue. Her analysis of the facts is uncontested 
and the conclusions drawn therefrom, resting on credibility 
resolutions, are consistent-with the record and the law. We, 
accordingly, affirm the ALJ's holding that PMCT's claim did not 
accrue until January 13, 1994, and that the March 28, 1994 notice 
of claim was timely presented to the District. 
The District also argues that the notice of claim, even if 
timely presented, was deficient in content. In this regard, the 
District argues that the copy of the charge sent to the District 
by the Director was not issued directly to its board of education 
as required by Education Law §3813 and that the charge itself did 
not affirmatively plead satisfaction of the Education Law §3813 
requirements. Those were also the circumstances, however, in 
Deposit, where the Court held that PERB's delivery of the 
^Odessa-Montour Cent. Sch. Dist. v. PERB, 228 A.D.2d 892, 29 
PERB ^7009 (3d Dep't 1996). 
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improper practice charge apprising the District of the nature of 
the claim being made against it, constituted substantial and 
satisfactory compliance with Education Law §3813. The 
circumstances being the same, Deposit is controlling,-' and the 
AKT's determination that Education Law §3813 was satisfied is 
properly affirmed. 
On the merits, employer procedures requiring an employee to 
participate in an investigatory meeting from which the employee 
is subject to discipline are unquestionably mandatory subjects of 
negotiation,-'' as are the grounds for the imposition of 
discipline.-7 The District's regulation requiring its employees 
to participate in a meeting with supervisors, the purpose of 
which is to investigate allegations of misconduct which could 
lead to disciplinary action against the employee, either as a 
-'Our holding in this respect does not represent our agreement 
that Education Law §3813 applies to any of our proceedings. We 
have previously expressed our belief that Education Law §3813 has 
no application to this agency's investigation and remedy of 
violations of law, a conclusion arguably supported by the Court 
of Appeals' recent decision in Cayuga-Onondaga BOCES v. Sweeney. 
89 N.Y.2d 395, 30 PERB ?[7501 (1996). In that case, the Court 
held that the Education Law §3 813 notice of claim requirements 
are inapplicable to the Labor Department's investigation of 
prevailing wage violations. Having concluded, however, that 
Education Law §3813 was satisfied in this case, we have no need 
to consider the effect of the Court of Appeals' decision on the 
Appellate Division's earlier decision in Deposit. 
-''E.g., Auburn Police Local 195 v. Helsby. 46 N.Y.2d 1034, 12 
PERB f7006 (1979), aff'g 62 A.D.2d 12, 11 PERB 117003 (3d Dep't 
1978). 
^Binghamton Civil Serv. Forum v. City of Binghamton, 44 N.Y.2d 
23, 11 PERB ?[7508 (1978). 
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result of that investigation and/or upon admissions of guilt 
obtained during that meeting, is clearly a mandatory subject of 
negotiation both because it is a disciplinary procedure and 
because it imposes a new ground for the imposition of discipline. 
Except as it bears upon the District's preemption argument, 
that the District's purpose in adopting its regulations is to 
protect students, employees or others from sexual harassment is 
immaterial to a negotiability analysis. The District's 
regulation by its nature is fundamentally disciplinary in nature 
and it does not become nonmandatory simply because it springs 
from a laudable motive.-7 
As to the District's preemption argument, we have carefully 
examined Title IX and the federal regulatory provisions and 
conclude that they do not even suggest, much less manifest, an 
intention by the federal government to exempt school districts 
from the collective bargaining obligations which attach under the 
Act. Nothing in Title IX or any of the regulatory provisions 
requires the type of disciplinary investigation imposed 
unilaterally by the District. 
It is the contention of the District and the amicus that 
bargaining under the Act cannot be required over any aspect of a 
sexual harassment policy or regulation because any bargaining 
-'Board of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of New York 
v. PERB, 75 N.Y.2d 660, 23 PERB fl7012 (1990). (Financial 
disclosure requirements intended to detect and deter corruption 
by government employees mandatorily negotiable.) 
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necessarily stands as an obstacle to the achievement by the 
District of a school environment free from discrimination on the 
basis of sex. Compulsory bargaining over any aspect of a sexual 
harassment policy or regulation would, according to their 
argument, frustrate the federal government's goals and, 
therefore, any state law requiring bargaining must fall under 
preemption theories adopted under the Supremacy Clause of the 
United States Constitution. 
Title IX and the regulatory provisions promulgated 
thereunder, however, stress flexibility. The regulatory 
provisions expressly recognize that sexual harassment policies 
and investigatory procedures "will vary considerably in detail, 
specificity and components reflecting . . . State or local legal 
requirements."—'' There is also specific recognition in the 
regulatory provisions that these state or local legal 
requirements, and collective bargaining agreements derived 
therefrom, can affect a school district's obligations in the 
development of procedures for the investigation of sexual 
harassment complaints and that state or local laws may create 
additional or separate rights for employees.—7 These 
regulatory statements are entirely inconsistent with any 
persuasive argument that the federal government intended to 
preempt bargaining otherwise required under state law. To the 
^
762 Fed. Reg. 12045 (March 13, 1997). 
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contrary, they clearly recognize that a school district's sexual 
harassment policies must observe an employee's legal rights, 
whatever their nature or source. 
Federal law at bottom requires only that a school district 
have an effective means for the investigation of allegations of 
sexual harassment of students. Other than imposing that general 
obligation, federal law imposes very few specific requirements 
upon a school district, and none in any respect relevant to the 
issue before us. 
To accept the District's preemption defense, we would first 
have to assume that bargaining over sexual harassment procedures 
affecting employees would always end without the parties reaching 
an agreement and, on that assumption, then conclude that an 
investigatory procedure lacking compulsory participation by the 
employee who is accused of the harassment is condemned to 
failure. We accept neither the assumption nor the conclusion. 
The District's preemption argument is clearly premature as 
it rests entirely on speculation divorced from any factual 
context. Its defense is advanced without any prior attempt to 
negotiate and premised on the theory that the mere possibility 
PMCT might not agree to this particular investigatory procedure 
is enough to extend to the District the right to unilaterally 
devise the investigatory system it wants. New York's Court of 
Appeals has repeatedly rejected arguments grounded upon the very 
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type of broad speculation as to future possibilities which lies 
at the core of the District's preemption argument.—7 
The conclusion which the District would have us draw is no 
more persuasive than the assumption upon which it rests. Our 
criminal justice system, which recognizes that an accused cannot 
be compelled to be a witness against self-interest, nonetheless 
produces effective investigations resulting in successful 
prosecutions. The District's argument that a sexual harassment 
investigatory procedure lacking the compulsory participation of 
the accused is so ineffective as to prevent the federal 
government from achieving its goal of having schools free from 
sex-based discrimination must be rejected. 
The merit of a preemption defense in the context of an 
applied setting, such as after negotiations had been undertaken 
and ended in impasse, is not an issue presented to us for 
decision and we express no opinion in that regard. We hold only 
that the mere possibility that bargaining over an investigatory 
procedure involving an employee who is accused of sexual 
harassment might present a preemption issue in some future 
context is not sufficient to warrant a conclusion that bargaining 
over all sexual harassment procedures is preempted. 
—
7State of New York Employment Relations Bd. v. Christ the King 
Regional High School, N.Y.2d , N.Y.L.J., p. 26, col. 2 
(June 13, 1997) (State Labor Relations Act not preempted by 
religious school's rights and obligations under federal 
constitution); Board of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City 
of New York v. PERB, supra note 9. 
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For the reasons set forth above, the charge concerning those 
parts of §§5148.8 and 2452.8 of the District's regulations 
pertaining to the filing of a resolution report in a unit 
employee's employment records is conditionally dismissed subject 
to a motion to reopen in accordance with our jurisdictional 
deferral policy. The ALJ's decision holding the District in 
violation of the Act for having adopted regulations 5148.8 and 
2452.8 is reversed. The ALJ's decision is otherwise affirmed and 
the District's exceptions as relevant thereto are denied. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the District: 
1. Rescind and cease enforcement as to employees in PMCT's 
unit those portions of §5148.4 and §2452.4 of the 
District's administrative regulations on sexual 
harassment providing that a principal or supervisor 
shall meet with a unit employee against whom a sexual 
harassment complaint has been filed to discuss the 
complaint and that the accused employee shall be asked 
to provide written assurances that the behavior 
constituting harassment, if admitted, will cease. 
2. Rescind any discipline taken against any unit employee 
who refused to participate in a meeting pursuant to 
§5148.4 or §2452.4 of the District's regulations on 
sexual harassment. 
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3. Sign and post the attached notice at all places 
normally used to post notices of information to 
employees in the unit represented by PMCT. 
DATED: September 9, 1997 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kmsella, Chairperson 
Marc *A. Ab'bott, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees in the unit represented by the Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers (PMCT) that the 
Patchogue-Medford Union Free School District will: 
1. Rescind and cease enforcement as to employees in the unit represented by PMCT those 
portions of §5148.4 and §2452.4 of the District's administrative regulations on sexual 
harassment providing that a principal or supervisor shall meet with a unit employee against 
whom a sexual harassment complaint has been filed to discuss the complaint and that the 
accused employee shall be asked to provide written assurances that the behavior constituting 
harassment, if admitted, will cease. 
2. Rescind any discipline taken against any unit employee who refused to participate in a 
meeting pursuant to §5148.4 or §2452.4 of the District's regulations on sexual harassment. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
PATCHOGUE-MEDFORD UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Thio tJryfir^a miiot ramoin nnotarl fr\r QH r*r%ntzar*iith/a Woi/o f r / im tha Wpto f\f r\r\e>tinn onrl tnnot nr\t ha a/tararl Hafanari r\r nr\\/ararl 
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by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ONEIDA COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPUTIES' 
POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO* C-4666 
COUNTY OF ONEIDA, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Oneida County Sheriff's 
Deputies' Police Benevolent Association has been designated and 
selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Deputy Sheriff Captain-Patrol, Deputy Sheriff 
Lieutenant-Technical, Deputy Sheriff 
Lieutenant-Patrol, Deputy Sheriff Sergeant-
Technical, Deputy Sheriff Sergeant-Patrol, 
Certification - C-4666 2 -
Deputy Sheriff-Patrol, Radio Dispatcher 
Supervisor, Dispatcher Sheriff, Supervising 
Public Safety Telecommunicator, Senior Public 
Safety Telecommunicator, Public Safety 
Telecommunicator, Clerk-Typist (assigned to Law 
Enforcement), and Senior Clerk (assigned to Law 
Enforcement). 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Oneida County Sheriff's 
Deputies' Police Benevolent Association. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: September 9, 1997 
Albany, New York 
V \rs<</ 0 
Pauline R. Kihsella/ Chairperson 
/ , 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4673 
TOWN OF TIOGA, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full-time and part-time employees of the 
highway department, cleaner, code enforcement 
officer and dog control officer. 
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Excluded: Superintendent and deputy superintendent of 
highways, assessor, justice court clerk and al 
other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to. 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: September 9, 1997 
Albany, New York 
